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Abstract. Biocybersecurity is a novel space for the 21st century that meets our 
innovations in biotechnology and computing head on. Within this space, many 
considerations are open for and demand consideration as groups endeavor to 
develop products and policies that adequately ensure asset management and 
protection. Herein, simplified and brief exploration is given followed by some 
surface discussion of impacts. These impacts concern the end user, ethical and 
legal considerations, international proceedings, business, and limitations. It is 
hoped that this will be helpful in future considerations towards biocybersecurity 
policy developments and implementations. 
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1 Introduction 
Biocybersecurity presents a new way of exploring how we protect our societies. 
It can be thought of in part as an extension of cybersecurity, which involves the 
protection of systems, made of hardware and software, from unauthorized access 
and attacks. Biocybersecurity is alternatively referred to as Cyberbiosecurity, 
which, according to the Peccoud Lab, exists at the intersection of cybersecurity, 
cyber-physical security, and biosecurity, and focuses on mitigating risks within 
and relating to their intersections [1, 2]. A growing need exists for expertise in 
this field as we persist in a world at a time where computer systems and 
biotechnology are increasingly ingrained in day-to-day life, in both developed and 
developing economies. Furthermore, strong lines eventually need to be drawn 
when determining where Biocybersecurity and other fields end, to adequately 
allot resources and focus towards adequately mapping vulnerabilities and prevent 
exploits that may occur and evolve [1].To this end, we have provisionally defined 
Biocybersecurity as thus: Any cybersecurity system where a biological 
component, target, or interlock is involved in the terminal or intermediate stages. 
 The first potential hurdle- is there a clear and present need for the development of 
an entirely new field of study? Let us first turn to the current ease of obtaining 
biological data. Whereas sequencing DNA used to be a rigorous process, it has 
gotten easier[3].In fact the Human Genome Project was  projected to last 15 years, 
and was completed in 13, demonstrating that the speed of computing and insights 
into the structure of life have made it easier than ever to obtain, disseminate, and 
utilize biological data [3]. Secondly- the processing and accessibility to the 
mentioned data is easier than ever. The physical barrier to acquiring healthcare 
data has been demolished in the name of ease of access and patient-centered care 
digitally. So, while the 
hardwaretocrackconventionalcybersecuritybarriersismoreprevalent,thesafeguard
sof that data have been chipped away. Thirdly, new computational platforms 
question the nature of the separation of biology and computing, leading to a more 
tightly integrated biocybersecurity process [3, 4]. Some rising platforms even call 
into question the contemporary understanding of typical cybersecurity processes 
and could circumvent typical security at the cost of creating entirely new (and 
unforeseen) problems that arise from biological matter and the application of 
medicine being used to perform computations [1, 4]. An entire new group of 
subdisciplines may be needed to understand the unknown complications that arise 
from use of these platforms [5]. All these features of modern healthcare and 
technology combine, meaning, that biological data can be applied in more ways. 
For instance, the process of implicit authentication using biological data is now 
possible with COTS(Commercial, Off-The-Shelf) components. A smartwatch can 
access multiple kinds of information including heart rate data and more [6]. The     
matching a set of recorded data to a user accessing a work terminal. However, 
this means that said data would, somehow, be accessible to other, perhaps 
nefarious, individuals. As touched on above, part of the rise of potential threats to 
in the field of biocybersecurity is the demand for easier and faster access to data. 
Patients desire faster, more convenient access to medical records; medical 
research companies need larger and more comprehensive trials; and data sets to 
remain viable for the more technically demanding medical interventions currently 
used [7–10]. Medical companies also need to increase their awareness of the 
potential of malware to compromise device outputs; for example, one research 
team's recently demonstrated an algorithm that could modify CT scans to mislead 
sick patients into believing that they are healthy and vice versa [11]. Inadequate 
defenses against such malware and inadequate protection of patient data could 
brew a maelstrom of related crises, on the scale of ransomware outbreaks [11]. 
The prevalence of such devices that demonstrate the confluence of biology and 
cybersecurity include thumbprint scanners, retina scanners, digitized healthcare 
records, forensics databases, DNA sequencing databases, and pharmacology 
records. All of these could be accessed and used for threats in the 
Biocybersecurity domain. The potential growth of biological data in demand is 
 seen in examples in the rise of services to sequence and interpret DNA as seen 
through ancestry and health services through DNA analysis. For a more concrete 
example of what is meant when they describe the definition of biocybersecurity: 
let’s say that a user is at a computer using implicit authentication. The computer’s 
security system tracks the eyes of the user, and if the saccic rhythms change, the 
computer locks the user. Under our definition, this would fall under 
biocybersecurity, as the system is using biological inputs or data as an 
intermediate step- in this case as preventative interlocks. 
2 Impacts and Considerations 
2.1 Some Ethical Considerations 
Let us consider some ethical conundrums that help us alternatively view problems 
within the field that relate to the previous examples. We’ll do so with a few, 
including the trolley problem and the Gettier Problem. The trolley problem states 
that a trolley can head down two tracks, and a moral operator selects which track 
to send it down- killing whoever is on either track. One considerable problem in 
this context is that with many of these bulk DNA or other -omics analyses, the 
operator is not directly at the switch. In fact, they may produce or remove multiple 
switches that complicate the ethical calculus involved with handling biological 
data that is digitalized. The use can get out of hand. The operators’ data collection 
gives way toward many more switch pullers, those who get their hands on the 
data, who can affect a great many lives beyond their original intention. Now let 
us pivot to another potential scenario with problems that might be faced: a 
business has access to a large amount of personal DNA data that gets mis-used. 
They use it to discover the prevalence of people that enjoy a certain kind of sugar 
more or consume considerably more than others. If they then mold their 
advertisements based on this data- either personally with internet-based ads or in 
bulk- are they responsible for the health of this population of people? With this 
data, companies within the food and beverage industry have an extra curated set 
of people who may have a higher difficulty of exercising proper agency over their 
dietary decisions. At the same time, they are working against their interests to not 
use such data. Insurance agencies might obtain and use this data with regards to 
modifying payment or coverage rates with diseases such as diabetes and other 
metabolism linked disorders in mind, their business model and consumer finances 
to juggle. Afterall, this must be viewed additionally in the light of emergent 
actions that appear from this data merely being available and obtainable. Once 
produced, it is subject to analysis by actors within who may not share company 
motives, companies that have data sharing agreements, malicious actors that may 
leak or funnel said data to other groups at multiple levels of power, and even 
harder to discern, meta- analysis by an independent company who is able to link 
 said DNA to the customers involved. Furthermore, analyses, both core and meta, 
of this data by companies that they share this with can lead to further emergent 
concerns of abuse. To summarize the Gettier Problem, it is a case on which an 
agent can have a justified basis for belief in a proposition and still be wrong about 
the fact of a matter. The Gettier Problem can be used to prompt us, within 
biocybersecurity, to consider what data we collect and hold, but also ask why and 
in what form and under what conditions we interface with the data and meta-data 
in terms of the risks posed if we are wrong about how such data might be used 
and abused. One must bet on the possibility of being wrong and the consequences 
that follow from that. We can relate this to biocybersecurity in which the same 
company above has a justified belief in their level of security, and yet suffers a 
breach that results in the leak of millions of sensitive and valuable biometrics. 
Companies must be willing to maintain ethical boards and rigorous standards to 
limit unnecessary data collection, holdings, transfers, eyes on data, and time of 
holding said data. They must be prepared for not only damage control, but 
compensation and talks with the public that they serve so as not to damage 
perceptions of biocybertechnologies with the public. For example, is the user of 
a hypothetical system made aware that their eye movements or other 
biosignatures, or biological means of expression are being tracked? Can the user 
manually turn this feature on and off? If no they should be made aware and be 
given the ability in case of potential abuse that they may have overlooked, the 
company must be ready to responsibly deal with the mountain of problems that 
may follow. In general, ethical approaches to biocybersecurity must be 
comprehensive. 
2.2 End User and Social Impacts 
As Biocybersecurity policy matures, it is ever prudent to consider social 
implications that exist in a world where biocybertechnologies and those adjacent 
become more prominent and their misuses become more of a threat. This 
increasingly applies to interconnected technologies that we easily and often take 
for granted, especially those that have benefitted from recent life sciences research 
as mentioned earlier. Let us consider the “Internet of Things”, known as IOT and 
the devices that can fall under this paradigm. IOT can be thought of as a mass 
constellation of devices connected to the internet [12]. You may recognize them 
in the form of commonly used products such as refrigerators that report on the 
quality of its contents or remind you on when to restock, your wearable exercise 
equipment that gives your heartrate or temperature, medical autoinjectors that 
monitor or regulate your insulin supply and report to your doctor, rooms that 
monitor your position and try to keep the room at a suitable temperature for you, 
implants that augment features of your body, or even more simply, your 
smartphone, with its bevy of sensors. Each of these devices gather and transmit a 
 variety of data that can directly or indirectly characterize consumers in ways that 
they may or may not consent to. Quite easily, a consumer can consent to the use 
of a device that monitors their heartrate, but to a skilled analyst, studying the 
heartrate over significant amounts of time can reveal one’s sleep, work, schooling, 
romantic, diet, and social behavior, in ways that the consumer certainly wouldn’t 
easily consent to. The same considerations can be applied to the earlier mentioned 
refrigerator, exercise equipment, and medical equipment – they all can give data 
which can generate a mesh of complex stories in different curated combinations 
and when interpreted differently [12]. Even when guarded with a degree of 
caution, a skilled hacker can gain access to said data, which leaves an ever-
existing risk with the nature of said technology for anyone with privacy in mind. 
With such data ever open to exploitation, one huge social implication is increased 
societal fear, and one to follow is the erosion of trust in advanced technology. 
Depending on how ingrained said technology is within companies or 
governments, this can mean erosion of trust and cooperation with those entities 
as these technologies become increasingly exploited at the detriment of citizens. 
Companies and large governments would do well to tread cautiously while and 
when employing these technologies. Failure to reign in control of said data could 
lead to mass social disarray, which could be irreparably injurious to societal 
stability, depending on the extent of the damage. One more source of lay 
perceptions of biocybersecurity that no doubt affect policy is popular media in 
how it has influenced how we may see and interact with such technologies. One 
considerable influencer is that of Cyberpunk culture, which encompasses futures 
that push the boundaries of technologies, leading to a blending or enhancement 
of humans and their technology in often unique and beneficial ways [13, 14]. In 
some stories, innovations within such literature often arise from lack the of 
oversight, or reduced confidence in the ability of the government to adequately 
assuage needs of a growingly frantic populace in the face of ever-growing 
technological reliance. Cyberpunk culture has also contributed to the growth of 
cultures like that of the Maker-movement, which is composed of individuals that 
are often resisting traditional, institutional control of technologies while self-
policing [13–15]. With respect to biology, some of them are addressing 
prosthetics, implantable electronics, gene editing and protein engineering, and 
bio-adjacent biotechnologies with wide appeal and potential to correct for 
deficiencies in their communities [14, 15]. An easy case to consider is that of the 
failure of the US government to control for drug prices, leading to some groups 
to take matters in their own hands to make them and analogues themselves such 
as some community bio labs that have met, with increasing success at mobilizing 
the community [13–15]. Some helpful efforts have just been to engineer other 
means of producing food, whereas others may aim to re-write some parts of life 
itself through the possibility of creating synthetic organisms [13–16]. Some of 
these groups may or may not apply for government funding and instead pursue 
 their own path to innovation through private or self-funded measures. Examples 
can be seen among a few groups in the Community Bio movement which arose 
out of the Maker Movement, in which groups of people have been inspired to 
pursue these research areas and more through a mix of traditional and non-
traditional cooperation with mixed success [17– 19]. Plenty of these successes 
resulted in the creation of start-ups that deal in a great amount of biometric data 
or material which is tracked, for improving health outcomes or expanding 
functions [14–19]. Much of what is thought of as cyberpunk in science fiction has 
reached reality, and this implies that the time to think ahead regarding the 
protection of biometric data is now. There’s little reason to suggest that these 
projects won’t become even more complex. Overall, there is much to consider 
socially as we consider and pursue cyberbiotechnological policies that address 
our increasing reliance and potential overexposure to such technology. Given that 
the base technology already exists by large and data is already being generated in 
volumes and at rates at which already has the potential to overly stir and stoke 
negative public action, we are able to need to bolster our foci on further social 
implications of such technology. To fail to do so can undo many societal gains 
within technologically advanced nations. 
2.3 Policy and Legal Impacts 
Quite a few policies have provisions and objectives that would be wise for groups 
to consider factoring into their cybersecurity policies. Some worthy of mention 
are the Nagoya Protocol, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, Dual 
Use Research of Concern, and the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act [2]. Each will be briefly summarized and drawn from. The 
Nagoya Protocol, known The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources 
and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization 
(ABS) to the Convention on Biological Diversity, is an act sign in 2010 that 
discussed a framework for sensible sharing and access to genetic resources, in the 
scope of preserving biodiversity [2, 20]. Aims of it are ensuring, flexible, consent-
based access to genetic resources that respect the jurisdiction to which said 
resources and or their owners belong to protect commercial and otherwise 
academic chains of value. The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act was 
passed in 2008 and has the aim of protecting people from DNA based health 
insurer and employee discrimination. A core weakness is that life and disability 
insurance as well as long term plans are not covered, leaving people up to the 
mercy of state government laws [2, 21]. Dual Use Research of Concern Policy, 
implemented in 2012, underlines policies to regulate life sciences research that 
could have a double edge. Means of research that pursue overly risky methods or 
are otherwise unethical face defunding and additional potential penalties [2, 22]. 
Lastly, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, originally 
 enacted in 1996, outlined a means of protecting citizen medical data while making 
it available to health professionals in order to allow adequate, if not superior care 
[2, 23]. This is increasingly important in an industry where data driven care is 
used to deliver more informed treatment wherein health professionals can learn 
of complications and patient differences, allowing for a more personalized and 
accurate care of an individual, reducing confusion. What can be taken from the 
existence of these policies is that in the context of cybersecurity, biocybersecurity 
policies will need to flexible, based on consent, and the benefit of whose 
information is at risk. Policies not taking this into account are likely to face 
considerable legal action. 
 
2.4 International Impacts 
Historically, the connection between health and international security was based 
on the spread of the diseases and disease-related casualties in wars. As scholars 
focused on political stability and considered the relation between democracy, 
growth and political stability, the relation was mostly seen as a democracy 
supporting or hindering role in growth and stability. [24] However, democracies 
also require economic and social well-being for political stability. A deterioration 
in public health has the potential of impacting political instability and public 
unrest in democratic nations. [25] This direct relationship between public health 
and political stability allows international actors (mostly autocratic ones) to use 
public health as a tool of coercive power in international relations. One other 
factor influencing general public health is the ascent of globalization with its 
positive and negative influences. While globalization has been a factor for the 
spread of diseases, the technology that brought widespread connectivity has at the 
same time highly benefited the health service providers in reaching populations 
in remote corners of the world [26]. The management of resources and making 
them available in most needed areas were facilitated through global 
connectedness. The link between interconnectedness, management of resources 
and making them available in most needed areas were facilitated with the global 
connectedness. All of this naturally brings concerns about the security, reliability, 
and resilience of this connectedness. The link between interconnectedness, public 
health and political stability naturally make biocybersecurity a concern for 
international relations. Furthermore, this relevance is strengthened with the 
 consideration of international political economy. Using the example from the  
Ethical Considerations section above, the fictious scenario below can help us 
understand the effects. Let’s assume that one nation or NGO finds that a 
competing nation is particularly susceptible to a specific non-infectious condition. 
To make this example concrete, let’s say Nation A is particularly susceptible to 
type 2 diabetes mellitus, and Nation B is a producer of Fructose. If Nation B 
increases marketing, increases supply, and seeks trade deals to increase the uptake 
of fructose in Nation A-does this count as a kind of stochastic act of war? This 
and similar questions form the landscape defining the impact of biocybersecurity 
on international security. 
 
2.5  Business Impacts 
Potential business impacts of biocybersecurity policies are wide reaching, 
leading significant effects of consumer trust, intellectual property (IP), domestic 
and international supply chains, and ultimately capital. In terms of consumer 
trust, the business impacts seen today from data breaches are likely not as far-
reaching as will be true in the future. This is potentially due simply to the lack 
of understanding of the value of user data and comparatively reduced coupling 
of individuals to data. As the more technically literate people become the 
primary consumers of such business, such mishandling of data breaches may 
have more dire consequences- especially if the data is biological in nature. In the 
same vein, as the demand for faster innovation rises, more biological IP 
(potentially even in the form of Trade Secrets) will be placed in digital formats, 
which renders it vulnerable to theft. Additionally, the new avenues of security 
breaching will not solely be in the domain of more advanced technology. As 
historical examples demonstrate even the most current technologies can be 
breached by relatively simple methods [27, 28]. A tangentially related topic 
would be the targeting of the synthetic biology supply chain. The supply chain 
of any manufacturing company is an important matter, but the biological field 
has its own major dangers and limitations when considering the items that it 
requires and exports [28]. At the core of the problems above, considerable 
 economic damage in the form of lost capital and weaknesses economic sectors 
linked to cyberbioeconomies is possible. 
2.6  Complications and Limitations 
The emerging spread of data processing methods into biological domains is, 
from a scientific perspective, a worthy and meaningful goal for many fields. 
However, the demand for faster and easier accessibility, the dependence on 
biometric data for security purposes, and the potential growth of automated 
biological analysis is a looming threat in the coming world. It is the hope of the 
authors that two goals were accomplished by reading this work. (1) That the 
“Failure of Imagination” that led to many threats in the cybersecurity domain 
will occur to a lesser extent after reading this work. (2) That the novelty of 
biodata will be seen as it is- not just an interesting benefit of the coordination of 
biology and computational sciences, but as an venue of attack. 
2.7  Conclusion 
There is little rationality in denying the currently robust and the potentially 
explosive growth of biocybersecurity as a field of thought, research, and action. 
The dangers presented in this paper, as well as the complications of our world 
are clear. The question is not one of what to do if these problems occur, but what 
do we do to prevent, ameliorate, and treat them? What are we going to do about 
it? 
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